{lib, pkgs, config, cfg, ...}: let 
    ifApparmor = cfg.apparmor.enable; 
in {
    opt.apparmor.enable = lib.mkEnableOption "apparmor";
    boot.kernelPackages = let
	kernel = pkgs.linux-libre;
	llvm = pkgs.llvmPackages_latest;

	version = pkgs.kernelPatches."hardened${kernel.meta.branch}".version;
	major = lib.versions.major version;

	sha256 = pkgs.kernelPatches.hardened."${kernel.meta.branch}:".sha256;
	modDirVer = lib.replaceStrings 
	    [ kernel.version ] 
	    [ version ] 
	    kernel.modDirVersion;
	in lib.mkDefault (pkgs.linuxPackagesFor (kernel.override {
	    stdenv = llvm.stdenv;
	    extraMakeFlags = [ "LLVM=${llvm.bintools-unwrapped}/bin/" ];
	    kernelPatches = kernel.kernelPatches 
		++ [ pkgs.kernelPatches.hardened."${kernel.meta.branch}" ];
	    modDirVersionArg = 
		modDirVer + 
		(pkgs.kernelPatches.hardened."${kernel.meta.branch}").extra;
	    isHardened = true;
	    argsOverride = {
		inherit version;
		src = pkgs.fetchurl {
		    url = 
		"mirror://kernel/linux/kernel/v${major}.x/linux-${version}.tar.xz";
		    inherit sha256;
		};
	    };
	    structuredExtraConfig = with lib.kernel; {
		# report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process
		BUG = yes;
		
		# safer page access permissions to prevent code injection
		DEBUG_RODATA = yes;
		SET_MODULE_RONX = yes;

		# validation of commonly targeted structures
		DEBUG_CREDENTIALS = yes;
		DEBUG_NOTIFIERS = yes;
		DEBUG_PLIST = yes;
		DEBUG_SG = yes;
		SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK = yes;

		# randomize page allocator when page_alloc.shuffle=1
		SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR = yes;
		
		# allow enabling slub/slab free poisoning with slub_debug=P
		SLUB_DEBUG = yes;

		# wipe higher-level memory allocations on free() with page_poison=1
		PAGE_POISONING = yes;
		PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY = yes;
		PAGE_POISONING_ZERO = yes;
		

		# reboot devices immediately when the kernel panics
		PANIC_TIMEOUT = freeform "-1";


		## GCC options (i use LLVM btw) ##

		# GCC_PLUGINS = yes; # Enable gcc plugin options	    
		# Gather additional entropy at boot time for systems that may not 
		# have appropriate entropy sources.
		# GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY = yes;
		# GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK = yes; # A port of the PaX structleak plugin
		# GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL = yes; # also cover structs passed by address
		# GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK = yes; # A port of the PaX stackleak plugin
		# GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT = yes; # A port of the PaX randstruct plugin
		# GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE = yes;

		# enable link-time optimisation
		LTO_CLANG_THIN = yes;

		# clear memory at reboot via EFI
		# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
		# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
		RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION = yes;

		# kernel memory permission enforcement
		STRICT_KERNEL_RWX = yes;
		STRICT_MODULE_RWX = yes;
		VMAP_STACK = yes;

		# kernel image and memory ASLR
		RANDOMIZE_BASE = yes;
		RANDOMIZE_MEMORY = yes;

		# randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata
		SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM = yes;
		SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED = yes;
		RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES = yes;

		# sanity check userspace page table mappings
		PAGE_TABLE_CHECK = yes;
		PAGE_TABLE_CHECK_ENFORCED = yes;

		# randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry
		RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT = yes;

		# stack frame overflow protection
		STACKPROTECTOR = yes;
		STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG = yes;

		# buffer length bounds checking
		HARDENED_USERCOPY = yes;
		FORTIFY_SOURCE = yes;

		# array index bounds checking
		UBSAN = yes;
		UBSAN_TRAP = yes;
		UBSAN_BOUNDS = yes;
		UBSAN_ALIGNMENT = yes;
		## unaligned memory access is bad and evil!!
		## sanitizing this will cause lots of reports and warnings though
		## it works on x86 though i think
		UBSAN_SHIFT = unset;
		UBSAN_DIV_ZERO = unset;
		UBSAN_UNREACHABLE = unset;
		UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP = unset;
		UBSAN_BOOL = unset;
		UBSAN_ENUM = unset;
		
		# sampling-based heap out-of-bounds and user-after-free detection
		KFENCE = yes;

		# linked list integrity checking
		LIST_HARDENED = yes;
		
		# zero-initialise heap variables on allocation
		INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT =yes;

		# zero-initialise stack variables on function entry
		INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO = yes;
		
		# disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup
		EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA = yes;

		# force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to
		# access stale data content
		IOMMU_SUPPORT = yes;
		IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT = yes;

		# do not allow direct physical memory access to non-device memory
		STRICT_DEVMEM = option no;		# depends on DEVMEM
		IO_STRICT_DEVMEM = option no; 	# depends on DEVMEM

		# provide userspace with seccomp BPF API
		# for syscall attack surface reduction
		SECCOMP = yes;
		SECCOMP_FILTER = yes;

		# provides some protections against SYN flooding
		SYN_COOKIES = yes;

		# enable kernel control flow integrity (currently Clang only)
		CFI_CLANG = yes;
		# CFI_PERMISSIVE

		# attack surface reduction; do not autoload TTY line disciplines
		LDISC_AUTOLOAD = no;

		# dangerous; enabling this disables userpace brk ASLR
		COMPAT_BRK = no;

		# dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout
		PROC_KCORE = no;

		# dangerous; enabling this disables userspace VDSO ASLR
		COMPAT_VDSO = no;

		# attack surface reduction: use modern PTY interface (devpts) only
		LEGACY_PTYS = no;

		# dangerous; allows writing directly to physical memory
		ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD = no;

		# attack surface reduction; has been used for heap based attacks
		INET_DIAG = no;

		# Security modules
		SECURITY_SELINUX = yes;
		SECURITY_APPARMOR = yes;
		SECURITY_SAFESETID = yes;
		DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR = lib.mkIf ifApparmor yes;
		DEFAULT_SECURITY = lib.mkIf ifApparmor (freeform "apparmor");
		SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE = lib.mkIf ifApparmor (freeform "1");

		# mark LSM hooks read-only after init
		SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS = no;

		# enable BPF; may expose kernel to spray attacks though
		BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON = yes;

		# Replace menu governour with TEO
		CPU_IDLE_GOV_MENU = no;
		CPU_IDLE_GOV_TEO = yes;
	    } // lib.optionalAttrs pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.isx86_64 {
		X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM = no;

		# don't sanitize unaligned memory access resulting in 
		# undefined behavior because x86 supports unalligned access
		UBSAN_ALIGNMENT = no;

		# enable chip-specific IOMMU support
		INTEL_IOMMU = yes;
		INTEL_IOMMU_DEFAULT_ON = yes;
		INTEL_IOMMU_SVM = yes;
		AMD_IOMMU = yes;
		
		# enforce CET Indirect Branch Tracking in the kernel
		X86_KERNEL_IBT = yes;

		# enable CET shadow stack for userspace
		X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK = yes;

		# disable legacy x86 interfaces
		STRICT_SIGALTSTACK_SIZE = yes;
		LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY = no;

		# modern libc no longer needs a fixed-position mapping in userspace,
		# remove it as a possible target
		LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE = yes;

		# disable IO delay
		IO_DELAY_NONE = yes;
	    };
	}));
    boot.kernelParams = [
	# set apparmor as the default security module
	(lib.mkIf ifApparmor "security=apparmor")

	# zero-fill page and slab allocations
	"init_on_free=1"

	# disable IO delay
	"io_delay=none"

	# enable page allocator free list randomization
	"page_alloc.shuffle=1"

	# overwrite free()'d pages
	"page_poison=1"

	# disable slab merging
	"slab_nomerge"

	# disable vsyscall mechanism
	"vsyscall=none"

	# enable transparent hugepages
	"transparent_hugepage=always"

	# disable debugfs
	"debugfs=off"

	# clear mlocked memory in case the program crashes
	"init_mlocked_on_free=1"
    ];
    boot.kernel.sysctl = {
	# disable automatic loading of TTY line disciplines
	"dev.tty.ldisc_autoload" = 0;

	"kernel.ftrace_enabled" = lib.mkDefault false;

	# disable first 64 KiB of virtual memory for allocation
	"vm.mmap_min_addr" = 65536;

	# increase ASLR randomisation
	"vm.mmap_rnd_bits" = 32;
	"vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits" = 16;

	# restrict ptrace()
	"kernel.yama.ptrace_scope" = 1;

	# enable hardened eBPF JIT
	"net.core.bpf_jit_enable" = 1;
	"net.core.bpf_jit_harden" = 1;

	# Dirty page cache ratio
	"vm.dirty_background_ratio" = 3;
	"vm.dirty_ratio" = 6;

	# Hide kptrs even for processes with CAP_SYSLOG
	"kernel.kptr_restrict" = lib.mkOverride 500 2;
    };
}
# references: 
# - https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/e6db435973160591fe7348876a5567c729495175/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/hardened/config.nix
# - https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Linux_kernel#Custom_configuration
# - https://kspp.github.io/
# - linux src/arch/x86/configs/hardening.config and src/kernel/configs/hardening.config
# - trial and error
# - illdef